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Abstract
Enterprises are facing a challenging dilemma. In order to be able to accommodate peak loads on their
IT systems, they must maintain large computing clusters, which lie idle most of the time. At the same
time, IT departments are under constant pressure to cut down on hard- and software expenses. Grid
technology offers a promising way out of this dilemma by allowing the dynamic sharing both within
enterprises as well as across organizational boundaries. This sharing approach, however, requires
proper economic incentives. This paper is concerned with the determination of dynamic market-based
prices. Due to their simplicity, so-called pay-as-bid mechanisms have become popular. This paper is
novel as we provide an in-depth analysis of two such pay-as-bid mechanisms – Proportional Share
and a discriminatory pay-as-bid mechanism – for the case of three users, thus extending previous
work by Sanghavi and Hajek (2004) and Stößer et al. (2008). This analysis is important as we show
that the nice results for two users cannot be retained once three or more users are present. Even
worse, we show that these results can even be reversed if we move to games with more than two
players.
Keywords: Pay-as-bid Mechanisms, Game-theoretic Analysis, Distributed Resource Allocation.
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INTRODUCTION

Increasingly complex applications require massive amounts of processing power while exhibiting
fluctuating utilization patterns. One example for such applications are CAx applications such as
Computer Aided Engineering and Computer Aided Design or so-called “digital factory applications”,
e.g. for production planning. As a result, companies pile up resources to accommodate few peak loads
on their systems. In a meta-study, Carr (2005) reports that data centers are only using between 10-35%
of their available processing power, leading to tremendous inefficiencies. This development is
exacerbated by intra-organizational boundaries. Even business units and departments within one
enterprise are unwilling to share idle resources with other units.
Grid technology offers a promising way out of this dilemma. Using virtualization technologies,
physical resources can be dynamically assigned to applications according to these applications’
priority. Thus, if a unit experiences a peak load on its system, it can accommodate this peak load on
remote resources, and analogously, in case an organizational unit temporarily has idle resources, it can
host applications of other units. These applications can be forced out and moved to other resources as
soon as the unit falls short of resources itself. In essence, Grid technology yields more efficient
resource utilization as the system load is distributed across all organizational units. This sharing
approach, however, requires proper economic incentives. Organizational units will only contribute
their resources to the Grid if they get something in return. At the same time, units need to charge
resource usage to avoid excessive usage. Both issues can be addressed by introducing dynamic prices.
This paper is concerned with the determination of dynamic prices that are simple enough to be useful
in Grids. Due to their simplicity, so-called pay-as-bid mechanisms have become popular – the user
simply pays what he bid, and receives a share of the resource according to some specific allocation
rule which relates this user’s bid to the other users’ bids.
This paper is novel as we provide an in-depth analysis of two such pay-as-bid mechanisms –
Proportional Share and a discriminatory pay-as-bid mechanism – for the case of three users, thus
extending previous work by Sanghavi and Hajek (2004) and Stößer et al. (2008). This analysis is
important as we show that the nice results for two users cannot be retained once three or more users
are present. Even worse, we show that these results can even be reversed if we move to games with
more than two players.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a sample scenario which illustrates the
business case for Grids. Section 3 discusses previous work on Grid market mechanisms. At the core of
this paper, Section 4 provides a game-theoretic analysis of Proportional Share and the discriminatory
pay-as-bid mechanism introduced by Sanghavi and Hajek (2004). In Section 5, we discuss our analytic
results. Subsequently, Section 6 concludes the paper and points to future research directions.

2

MOTIVATIONAL SCENARIO

In the following, we showcase a scenario where market mechanisms create value in real business
cases. The scenario is TXTDemand, an application by TXT e-solutions1 for forecasting demand and
replenishment within a supply chain. The application combines CPU intense forecasting algorithms as
well as algorithms for the analysis of historic data and current sales data with interactive revision
tools. In a typical business scenario, a customer is running the application daily for defining demand
and replenishment strategies. During the night batches process the previous days’ sales data to define
initial forecast plans. For example, the replenishment module generates optimized replenishment
plans, taking historic inventory levels, future demand forecasts and the type of the market into
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consideration. The plans are analyzed and refined by the user at the other day in the interactive mode.
The rationale for user interaction in the planning process is that users have more in-depth knowledge
about the context. For example, if a certain fair takes place for the first time, the replenishment plan
generated from historical data are most likely ignoring this. The user can, hence, significantly improve
the replenishment plan by conducting as-if scenario analyses, refining the automatically produced
plan.
The calculations of the replenishment module are particularly resource demanding when used in real
business due to the very large amounts of data surpassing several hundred millions of entries. Grid
computing can help by distributing the calculations on several machines. By pooling resources of
several providers, the costs for IT infrastructure can be significantly reduced. Since the calculations
are so demanding, the total cost of ownership for one company alone would make the use of the
forecasting module unprofitable. It is the pooling of resources in a Grid that amortizes the use of the
replenishment module. As the pure sharing of resources without compensation is hampered by freeriding behavior, market mechanisms seem to work well, establishing the right incentives for the
participants.
The market mechanisms need to cope with the peculiarities of the domain. We identify two main
requirements for the market mechanism. In case of interactive applications, the requests for Grid
resources depend on daily human interactions. Thus there can be unpredictable peaks of requests,
occurring at any second. This requires from the mechanism to attain an allocation of resources in near
real-time. Furthermore, from a technical viewpoint, avoiding starvation is an important objective. In
scheduling theory, starvation denotes the fact that low-priority tasks are prevented from doing any
progress because all resources are assigned to other higher-value tasks. Combining the economic and
the technical viewpoint, it can be desirable to give “better” service to high-value applications but to
also give at least “some” service to low-value applications.

3

RELATED WORK

A bulk of mechanisms has been proposed for Grid resource allocation (see Wolski et al. (2001) and
Neumann et al. (2008) for surveys). In AuYoung et al. (2004), Bapna et al. (2006) and Schnizler et al.
(2006), the scheduling problem in Grids is formalized as a combinatorial allocation problem. Bapna et
al. (2006) and Stößer et al. (2007) present greedy heuristics to mitigate the resulting computational
complexity. While these mechanisms allow for dependencies between multiple Grid resources (e.g.
CPU and memory), they are based on strong informational assumptions, such as complete knowledge
about the time constraints and resource requirements of applications. However, in practice the users
themselves will only have fuzzy knowledge about this information, as can be seen when comparing
the user estimates and actual runtimes and resource requirements in workload traces from
supercomputers.
A fundamentally different approach is taken by mechanisms that continuously assign resource shares
to applications. These shares are continuously updated as new user requests are submitted or tasks are
completed, thus allowing for real-time allocations. With an allocation rule purely based on economic
reasoning (e.g. the prominent Vickrey auction), all available resources would be given to one single
user, with the highest valuation. However, this will lead to the starvation of other tasks with lower
value. Consequently, considering the requirements of our scenario, in this work we will consider two
different allocation mechanisms: Proportional Share (Chun and Culler 2000, Lai et al. 2004) and the
discriminatory pay-as-bid mechanism by Sanghavi and Hajek (2004).
Proportional Share is well understood and has been implemented by Hewlett Packard in its Tycoon
system (Lai et al.). If user reports a valuation of , he will receive a fraction of the resources
amounting to ∑
.

The discriminatory pay-as-bid mechanism has been proposed by Sanghavi and Hajek (2004) for
bandwidth allocation in computer networks. It works slightly different than Proportional Share, giving
a discount to the high-value user, thus resulting in a lower unit price than the low-value users. The idea
is to encourage the high-value user to bid close(r) to his true valuation rather than to shade down his
bid. We will denote the allocated share for each user of users for Proportional Share with
∏
and the Sanghavi-Hajek allocation rule with
. Sun
1
∑

Microsystems is considering to integrate the latter mechanism into their Sun Grid Engine (Stößer et al.
2008).
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THE MODEL

One of the main goals of this work is to compare the performance of the two given allocation
mechanisms and thus to conclude which of these may be more appropriate for use in typical Grid
scenarios. Clearly our work is abstract and can be applied to other domains as well though in this work
we restrict our attention to Grids as the mechanisms can be applied there reasonably.
In general the performance of mechanisms can be measured analytically, through simulations or with
laboratory experiments. In this work though we will focus on analytical evaluation since it is well
known that a common metric for measuring a mechanisms performance analytically is given by
computing the performance ratio in its Nash equilibrium. Therefore we outline the setting used in our
work and give a short introduction into Nash equilibria followed by the main analysis of the Nash
equilibria of the two allocation mechanisms, Proportional Share and Sanghavi-Hajek. We will analyze
under which conditions (multiple or unique) Nash equilibria exist for the case of more than two users.
It is well known that the results from 2-player games cannot always be generalized to n-player games.
Since this applies to our analysis as well, we will consider three players first, showing the tremendous
challenges and difficulties as well as the rigorous conditions one encounters even for the simple case
of one additional player.
4.1

The Setting

We assume there is an auction with one seller who offers a perfectly divisible good (i.e. there are no
constraints in how many parts the good may be split up nor the size of these parts) and buyers, each
one offering a bid
and receiving a share through the utilized allocation mechanism . Let
,…,
0 for
1, … , with at
be the vector of bids given by the users. We also assume
0, since a positive
represents the payment made by user . At this point we may
least one
are submitted, since this
already say, that we can exclude any Nash equilibria, where negative bids
would mean that user would receive a payment by the seller for his allocated part of the good and
thus would turn into a seller, also leading to a contradiction to the assumption of a given non-negative
payment vector. The vector
,…
,
,∑
1, denotes the actual allocation, where
the shares for each user are allocated according to the allocation mechanism
for the Sanghavifor Proportional Share respectively, where each mechanism depends on the
Hajek mechanism and
payment vector . Furthermore we assume in line with auction theory (Mas-Colell et al. 1995) that
denoting the valuation
, with
each user has a quasi-linear utility function
the linear price function, where denotes user ’s unit price,
of user for the good and
i.e. the price user would have to pay if she were awarded with the whole resources. As was shown in
Johari and Tsitsiklis (2004), when evaluation the worst-case performance ratio in our setting, it is
enough to look at linear utility functions.
Additionally we use in our setting a so-called pay-as-bid pricing scheme, so that we have
,
1, … , . Thus we can reformulate the utility functions to
.

4.2

Nash Equilibria

Since the main goal of this section is to analyze the possible Nash equilibria for the several given
allocation mechanisms for two, three and users, the concept and the idea behind this equilibrium
needs to be clear. One of the main goals of mechanism design is to construct these mechanisms in a
way that they are incentive compatible, i.e. each user bids his true valuation of the good and has no
advantage of reporting false valuations, because it will not lead to any improvement for him. In this
situation the concept of Nash equilibria is widely used (cf. Sanghavi and Hajek 2004).
Definition 1. (Nash equilibrium) A bid vector
is a Nash equilibrium, if
,
for all
1, … , , meaning that no user can benefit by unilaterally deviating from his equilibrium
bid
.
For a given allocation mechanism there may exist no, one unique or several Nash equilibria. We will
analyze under what conditions we may retrieve no equilibrium but by changing the realizations of the
users bids and/or valuations slightly we obtain a unique or several Nash equilibria. Also we have not
only to worry about multiple Nash equilibria but also acceptable (i.e. feasible) ones, meaning that we
will not accept any solution resulting in a contradiction to our assumptions as already pointed out
above. Having said this we will speak of a feasible Nash equilibrium if an equilibrium chosen out of a
given set of several Nash equilibria fulfills all taken assumptions and leads to no contradiction at all.
Therefore for any possible solution we have to check afterwards if the foregoing assumptions and
conditions still hold.
Given the term of a Nash equilibrium we may define the performance ratio of an allocation
mechanism:
Definition 2. (Performance ratio) Suppose a set of users each having a utility function
provider selling the perfectly divisible good with a utility function . Let the bid vector
Nash equilibrium. Then the performance ratio of a given allocation mechanism is given by

and a
be a

∑
where

denotes the theoretical optimum giving the whole good to the user with the highest bid.

The subsequent analysis will be along the following lines: We will compute the resulting Nash
equilibria for
users (
2, 3 ) for the Sanghavi-Hajek as well as the Proportional Share
mechanism. We will show under which conditions these equilibria exist and to what outcome (utility
function) they entail. For this we use the following, well known proposition:
Proposition 3. For a set of given users ,
if and only if

0 for all

1, … , , the payment vector

is a Nash equilibrium,

1, … , .

Proposition 3 simply means that every agent maximizes his own utility in conjunction with all bids
given by the other agents.
4.3

Two Users

Stößer et al. (2008) analyze the case with two requesters. We will briefly report the main results for
and
and without
the sake of completeness. We assume that the two users have the valuations
.
loss of generality user 2’s valuation is not less than user 1‘s, i.e.
Lemma 4. In the Nash equilibrium
receives a share of
.

of the pay-as-bid mechanism
, whereas user 2 bids

, user 1 bids

, thus receiving

and
1

Inserting the above results in the utility functions
receives zero utility, while the high-value user has
Lemma 5. In the Nash equilibrium

for every user , shows that the low-value user
.

of the pay-as-bid mechanism

and receives a share of

, user 1 bids

, whereas user 2 bids

, thus

.

receiving

Consequently, for two users there exists a unique Nash equilibrium without implying further
restrictions on the valuations of the users. Unfortunately, as we will show below, this does not hold
any longer for three or more users.
4.4

Three Users

Now we will show our results for three users followed by additional examples demonstrating that our
argumentation is not based on an empty set but that there exist scenarios allowing us to apply our
analytic results. To illustrate our approach for each proposition we sketch the proofs which are
straightforward but very in the appendix. We begin with the results of our analysis for the proportional
Share mechanism for three users and subsequently move to the Sanghavi-Hajek mechanism.
4.4.1

Proportional Share

In this section we will analyze whether there exist a unique Nash equilibrium when there are three
users present. Our main result is captured by Proposition 6, which is quite powerful, as it shows the
conditions for which feasible Nash equilibria exist.
Proposition 6. For three users with quasi-linear value functions there exists no unique Nash
equilibrium for the Proportional Share allocation mechanism. Given the restrictions
,

and

there exists a feasible equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 6 illustrates clearly that there does not exist a unique but two Nash equilibria, from which
only one is feasible as it avoids payments from the seller to the user. The restrictions imply certain
conditions (i.e. lower bounds) on the realizations of the valuations of the users but are not unlikely to
happen in real-world scenarios, since they though being strong are nevertheless easy to check and
fulfill. For the sake of simplicity we state them as a composition of constraints between the bids and
the valuations, but since the bids depend unambiguously on the valuations only, more complex terms
may be stated just using the users valuations. For more details we refer the reader to the appendix.
Example 7. We will give two simple examples, which illustrate this proposition. Assume there is a
provider offering a certain amount of Terabytes of storage and three users having their own valuation
and willing to pay a certain amount to achieve a share of the storage. The valuations are common
knowledge and each user bids strategically trying to maximize his own utility.
a) We assume the valuations to be
compute the only payment vector

1,

2 and
3. Using the results above we can
,
,
. The negative value of
is the result

of the third condition of the above proposition not being fulfilled, as
. Thus there exists no Nash equilibrium even for this simple case.

1

b) Changing the valuations given in a) slightly, yields us a feasible outcome and Nash
equilibrium: Assuming that we have the realization of the valuation vector
2, 3, 4 this

,

yields

,

amounting to a total revenue for the provider of ∑
4.4.2

,

and the following vector of utilities

,

thus

.

Sanghavi-Hajek Mechanism

In this section we analyze Nash equilibria for the Sanghavi-Hajek mechanism. These results differ
very much from the ones we achieved for the Proportional Share mechanism.
Proposition 8. For three users, the Sanghavi-Hajek allocation mechanism combined with a pay-as-bid
pricing scheme and quasi-linear utility functions, we have
√ √

a) A unique Nash equilibrium for the realization

and the

condition
, resulting in zero utility for the lower-bidding users and nonnegative utility for the highest-bidding user.
√ √

b) Multiple Nash equilibria for
valuations of the three users being so that 2

and the realizations of the

3

for

1, 2 holds.

Proof. See Appendix.
As we learn from Proposition 8, for the Sanghavi-Hajek mechanism a unique Nash equilibrium may
exist, but occurs under very restrictive assumptions on the users valuations. We can state immediately
as given above for a unique equilibrium is very
that in a real-world scenario the exact realization of
unlikely to happen and tends to converge to zero. This is due to the fact that users usually will have
expectations only about the valuations of the other users. Multiple Nash equilibria may also exist
under less restrictive conditions though these conditions as seen in Proposition 8 depend on the highest
given bid
. A strict dependency on the valuations of the users only can’t be given since
is not
determined but can be chosen freely above the limit.
Example 9. To clarify our results, we give two short examples assuming the same scenario as already
given in Example 7.
a) Taking into account the conditions involved for finding a unique Nash equilibrium, we
1 and
assume the realizations of the valuations of the lower-bidding users to be
√

√2. Thus the users may bid the strategy
√

√
√

resulting in a utility vector

0, 0,

√
√

and

.

b) If given the valuation vector
3, 3, 5 all necessary conditions are satisfied, resulting
in a zero utility for the lower-bidding users and a positive utility for the highest bidder.
It is obvious that the conditions necessary for having a Nash equilibrium for both allocation
mechanisms are different. The question which arises now is if the conditions given for one mechanism
are stronger than the ones of the other meaning that if we have given one Nash equilibrium of one
mechanism we would obtain automatically an equilibrium of the second allocation mechanism and
thus allowing us to compare these mechanisms one to another. Fortunately we have the following
result:
Corollary 10. Assume a unique Nash equilibrium
for the Sanghavi-Hajek mechanism. Then
is also a feasible equilibrium for Proportional Share.
Proof. See Appendix.
With this we may now compare the performance ratio of the two given allocation mechanisms
assuming we have the conditions fulfilled for a unique Nash equilibrium for Sanghavi-Hajek. Since

the proof is a simple computation and straightforward it is omitted. We just state the final result of our
paper:
Corollary 11. Assume a unique Nash equilibrium
for the Sanghavi-Hajek mechanism. Then the
performance ratio for the Proportional Share mechanism exceeds the ratio of the Sanghavi-Hajek
mechanism for all feasible realizations of and .
This outcome is very surprising indeed as it is in opposition to the result obtained by Stößer et al.
(2008) for two users and will be discussed in the following section.
for the Sanghavi-Hajek mechanism. Then the
Corollary 12. Assume a unique Nash equilibrium
revenue for the Proportional Share mechanism is exceeded by the revenue of the Sanghavi-Hajek
mechanism for all feasible realizations of and .
This result coincides with the work for 2-players done by Stößer et al (2008).

5

DISCUSSION

Our goal is to compare market mechanisms which can be integrated into existing Grid schedulers to
achieve efficient resource allocations and dynamic prices. As pointed out earlier, there are three
possible techniques to do such a comparison: game-theoretic analysis, numerical experiments, and
laboratory experiments. In this paper, we report the results of our game-theoretic approach.
Earlier work on Proportional Share and the discriminatory pay-as-bid mechanism for the two user case
has shown that the Sanghavi and Hajek mechanism is superior to Proportional Share with respect to
overall efficiency and, given sufficiently close valuations of the two users, also as regards provider’s
revenue (Stößer et al. 2008). The aim of our analysis in this paper was to generalize these results for
more than two users. To this end, we need to model the user behavior, i.e. how the users bid based on
their true valuations. We chose to ground our analysis on the assumptions of quasi-linear utility
functions and the prominent solution concept of Nash equilibria. We were able to derive conditions on
the existence of such equilibria for both the Proportional Share and the Sanghavi and Hajek
mechanism. However, the interpretation of these equilibria for the Sanghavi and Hajek mechanism
gives rise to four issues:
• The two low-bidding users are pushed to zero utility while the high-bidding user only achieves a
slightly positive utility, meaning that the provider reaps almost all the welfare generated by the
mechanism. This corresponds to the results of Stößer et al. (2008) for the two user case.
Consequently, the users are indifferent to not participating in the mechanism. One possibly remedy
could be that the provider gives a small kickback to the low-bidding users to encourage them to
participate. It can be an interesting question for future research to investigate how this impacts the
users’ strategic considerations.
• The user with the lowest valuation ends up being the highest bidder. We explain this somewhat
paradoxical result by the fact that in order to achieve a (unique or feasible) Nash equilibrium we
had to set up some (rigorous) restrictions on the valuations of the users. Obviously this cannot be
done in real-world scenarios and though this procedure is legitimate from a mathematical point of
view, it may result in odd economic interpretations.
• The unique Nash equilibrium comprises some interesting cross-dependencies between the given
bids. Assume two users bid according to their equilibrium strategy. If one of the low-value users
deviates from his bid, this will not affect his own utility, but instead result in a decrease of the other
users’ utilities.
• Interestingly, as shown in Corollary 11, the analytic results for the performance ratio reverse if we
move from a scenario with two users to a scenario with three users. While with two users the
Sanghavi-Hajek mechanism always generates higher efficiency than Proportional Share, with three
users Proportional Share dominates the Sanghavi-Hajek mechanism.

In summary, our analysis showed that complexity increases tremendously already when adding only
one more user. We need to introduce strong restrictions on the users’ valuations in order to obtain
feasible Nash equilibria, let alone unique equilibria. While the analytic approach is attractive due to its
elegancy, this strikingly shows the limitations of the analytic approach, as these equilibria are unlikely
to occur in real-world scenarios.
This is exacerbated by the fact that we assume a scenario with complete information. In practice, users
will at most have a rough estimate about the valuations of other users. Including such Bayesian
solution concepts into our model would surely drive complexity beyond analytic feasibility.
In conclusion, we need to rely on numerical simulations and/or laboratory experiments when trying to
analyze these mechanisms in more complex and realistic settings.

6

CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK

In this article, we have approached the concept of scheduling in Grid systems from an economic
viewpoint. Due to the strategic nature which is inherent to these systems, market-based schedulers are
deemed promising to increase the efficiency of such systems, while at the same time providing
incentives to contribute resources to the Grid. So-called pay-as-bid mechanisms score with their easeof-use. Furthermore, they impose only a very low communicational and computational burden on the
scheduling process and consequently allows for real-time allocations.
In this paper, we analyzed the Proportional Share mechanism and the discriminatory pay-as-bid
mechanism by Sanghavi and Hajek (2004), two prominent proxies of such pay-as-bid mechanisms,
thus extending previous work by Sanghavi and Hajek (2004) and Stößer et al. (2008). In order to study
the performance of these mechanisms, e.g. as regards efficiency and provider’s revenue, we modeled
the strategic behavior of rational users using the prominent solution concept of Nash equilibria. The
result of this paper is twofold. We show that for three users, Nash equilibria can only be obtained
under strong assumptions. Moreover, in case we have a Nash equilibrium which holds for both
mechanisms, Proportional Share achieves higher efficiency than the Sanghavi-Hajek mechanism, thus
reversing the results for two users.
This shows the limitations of the analytic approach in more complex and realistic settings, and
strengthens the case for alternative techniques. In the future, we will analyze the mechanisms by
means of numerical experiments. This will allow us to model agents with learning capabilities. It will
also be interesting to compare these simple pay-as-bid mechanisms to combinatorial approaches to
Grid resource allocation, which have been proposed by several authors (cf. Neumann et al. 2008 for an
overview). Moreover, our analysis is set within a real-world scenario, the Biz2Grid project which we
introduced earlier. We thus plan a prototypical implementation of a market-based scheduler, which
will serve as proof of our concept.
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APPENDIX

Proof of Proposition 6. Applying the conditions given in Proposition 3 leads us to the following
system of equations, where for the sake of simplicity we write
instead of
for the components
of the strategic choosen Nash equilibrium payment vector:
,

and
.

Solving this system leads us to a unique value of

and two possible options of

,

and

:
and

.
Clearly we have multiple Nash equilibria. In order to achieve a unique equilibrium we have to imply
one condition on the valuation of user 3, i.e.
4
0 yields the condition
. Furthermore, we need to check whether or not all payments

made by the users are

non-negative, which is not given by the above equations. A simple computation shows us, that
is equivalent to
,
0 is equivalent to
and
0 is equivalent to

0

. Of course all of these conditions may be expressed by the valuations ,
1, … ,3, but
results in much more complex inequations. This leads us directly to the conclusion that there is no
yields to the negative bid
unique Nash equilibrium for three users, since the realization of
0, which is not feasible. Finally, it is straightforward, that for any positive value of
we obtain
_ 0, hence we may discard the second solution and focus on
and
though we may not
speak of a unique equilibrium but rather of a feasible equilibrium.

Proof of Proposition 8. In order to be able to apply the mechanism, we have to determine the user who
submitted the highest bid. Without loss of generalization we may assume an ascending order for the
payment vector, thus being
the highest bid. Similar to the discussion of the Proportional
Share allocation mechanism we have the following equation system
,

and
,

which leads to two possible solutions of
9

:
18

81

.

It is obvious that in order to obtain a unique Nash equilibrium, the sum contained in the root has to be
zero, hence we need to demand a further condition on one of the valuations. Choosing that valuation to
be
18
it has to be that 81
valuations and
resulting in a direct dependency of
two possible solutions for

√ √

0 is valid for all
from the other two valuations. We receive
and therefore forcing

to be on a cone-like

structure.
As it is seen, the second solution gives us, even for very high valuations of the remaining two users, a
relatively low value of the third valuation, though we assumed the third user to be the highest bidder.
Since this scenario appears to be an extreme unlikely case, we may discard the second solution and
and thus for
, both depending only on
focus on the first. Therefore we have a unique solution for
the valuations of the first two, lower-bidding users. The question is, if that is the one and only
restriction even though it is a very tough condition and may rarely be achieved in real-world
applications. Unfortunately the answer is that we need even more restrictions, this time on the
realizations of the valuations of the lower-bidding users to ensure 0
for
1, 2, since
otherwise we would have a contradiction to our primary assumptions. A simple computation shows us
and 2
, while the second inequality holds if
that the first inequality holds, if 2
. Since we need both inequalities to hold and the second condition already implies the first
one, we may focus thereon, which leaves only a narrow margin for the possible choices of and .
will take
At this point we have to remark, that for any given valuations of the lower-bidding users,
on a value which is less than any of this valuations, though we already have chosen the highest
will be reached exactly if
possible value accordingly to our calculations. The maximum for
or vice versa, since the lower-bidding users are symmetric, i.e. it does not matter who bids or
valuates the good more than the other one, as long as they do not bid higher than the third user.
Using the results above, we may compute a solution under the given conditions on the valuations ,
1, … ,3. Since the components of the resulting payment vector are relatively complex, we just
1, 2, of the lowerstate here the final result of the utility functions: For any given valuations ,
0 for
1, 2 while the utility of the higherbidding users their utility functions equal zero, i.e.
.
bidding user is besides being relatively low, non-negative for
Finally, omitting the restriction of a unique Nash equilibrium we may analyze the case of two
being on the cone like
equilibria. As is seen in Figure 1 a unique equilibrium is achieved for
not holding that requirement we can distinguish between two cases: First,
being
structure. For
taking a value outside the cone. For the first case, it is easily seen,
inside the structure and second,
that we have no Nash equilibrium at all, because we have to deal with a square root of a non-positive

value. In the second case, we may discard the possibility of
taking a value below the structure
because we assumed the third user to be the highest bidder and thus this choice seems odd. So we
proceed with the following condition
1
3

3
9

4√2√
14

. To ensure a feasible solution,
which gives rise to two Nash equilibria depending on the choice of
i.e. 0
for
1, 2, a subsequent analysis shows that it has to hold that 2
3
for
1, 2 resulting in a zero utility for these users as well. At this point we may remark, that
is ascending and limited for all choices of
and converges so that we have
lim

.

We see, that the above condition on the valuations of the lower-bidding users is based upon the value
. Therefore, instead of being able to check the conditions just on the given valuations of the
of
three users, we have to compute
first, followed by a decision, which solution of
to use. Having
in mind the conditions on ,
1, 2, gives rise to the consideration choosing strategically
and
though one cannot eliminate the possibility of a feasible equilibrium with the last
discard
realization.
Proof of Corollary 10. We just have to show that the conditions on the valuations of the users which
are being implied by the unique Nash equilibrium satisfy also the conditions necessary for a feasible
equilibrium for the Proportional Share mechanism. This is straightforward. We may fix without loss of
has to satisfy
. A simple
generalization the valuation of the first user . Then
analysis shows us that , depending on the other valuations, is ascending and thus we choose the
with
. This yields
and thus the first condition
lowest possible value for
for Proportional Share holds. To check the second condition

we confirm that

is

fixed and the above choice of
this results in
and the
ascending as well and with
second condition holds as well. Since
depending on
is also ascending we continue with the
and have
which makes the third condition hold for all possible
above choice of
realizations of the valuations of the users implied by the conditions of the unique Nash equilibrium by
the Sanghavi-Hajek mechanism thus concluding our proof.

